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n. OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of Appellant James Parmer·s petition for 
post-conviction relief. Relief should be granted because the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to have a police interview 
admitted at trial and in failing to elicit testimony concerning the ilioinguinal nerve from 
Mr. Parmer or any of the av,,._O,.TC' who testified. 
B. Procedural Historv 
On January l 0, 2006, Mr. Parmer was charged with a single count of lewd conduct with a 
minor under age sixteen in violation of LC. § 18-1508. A five day jury trial was held in July 
2006, but the jury could not reach a verdict. A second six day jury trial the next month resulted 
in a guilty verdict. Mr. Parmer was sentenced to 20 years with a minimum term of 7 years 
followed by an indeterminate term of 13 years. R 1098. 
Mr. Parmer appealed. The issues raised on appeal concerned the admission of IRE 
404(b) testimony from eight other women claiming that Mr. Parmer, a physical therapist, had 
engaged in sexual contact with them during massages; the refusal of trial counsel's request for a 
continuance to prepare for two new 404(b) witnesses on retrial; the admission of the testimony of 
one of the 404(6) witnesses on retrial after she had attended portions of the first trial; and the 
decision sustaining the s hearsay objection to testimony concerning statements Mr. Parmer 
made during a police interrogation. Appellate relief was denied. State v. Panner, 147 Idaho 210. 
207 P.3d 186 (Ct. App. 2009). R 96-114. 
Mr. Parmer then filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. R 5-22. Mr. Parmer 
moved for summary judgment and the state moved for summary dismissal. Following briefing 
and a hearing on the motions, the court summarily dismissed the petition. R 1098-1130. 
This appeal timely follows. R 1159-1162. 
C. Statement of Facts From Underlying Trial 
Mr. Parmer, a physical therapist, used therapeutic massage in patient treatments. K.R., a 
fourteen-year-old girl being treated for migraine headaches and leg pain, said that during a 
massage, Mr. Parmer used a vibrating massaging tool intended to relieve muscle tension of her 
inner thigh in a position as to cause her sexual arousal. She also said that Mr. Parmer engaged in 
manual-genital contact. State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 213,207 P.3d at 189. R 96-97. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing the claim that trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective in failing to have a police interview admitted into evidence for the 
non-hearsay purpose ofrebutting a claim ofrecent fabrication? Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution; Idaho Constitution, Art. I, § 13. 
2. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing the claim that trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective in failing to present evidence concerning the ilioinguinal nerve? 




/\. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing the Claim That Counsel 
Was Ineffective in Failing to Have a Police Interview Admitted Into Evidence 
l. Facts Relevant to Claim 
At trial, the state presented evidence of a confrontation call made by K.R. to Mr. Parmer 
the day after she claims he touched her. Trial Tr. p. 379, ln. 2-18; p. 1114, ln. 9 - p. 1116, ln. 6; 
R 239, 522. Just after the call, Mr. Parmer was arrested and taken to jail where his interrogation 
was recorded. Trial Tr. p. 386, ln. 4 - p. 390, ln. 2; p. 1116, ln. 13 - p. 1121, ln. 24; R 241, 522-
523. During the interrogation, Mr. Parmer explained that he had used a massager to treat K.R. 
because he has arthritis and his hands were tired. R 800-803. 
During the trial, Mr. Parmer testified that he had used the massager because he has 
arthritis and his hands were tired. Trial Tr. p. 1792, ln. 9 - p. 1793, ln. 1 0; R 693. Then on cross, 
the state pointed out that Mr. Parmer had not mentioned arthritis and tired hands during the 
confrontation call. Trial Tr. p. 1845, ln. 25 - p. 1846, ln. 11; R 706. See also, Trial Tr. p. 1874, 
ln. 6-14; R 713. 
Trial counsel attempted to present evidence of the police interrogation where Mr. Parmer 
had explained the reason for the massager was that he had arthritis and his hands were tired but 
was unsuccessful. Trial Tr. p. 1816, In. 4 - p. 1818, ln. 4; R 699. 
Even though the prosecutor was aware of the content of the interrogation, she argued in 
closing that "this whole business about his hands started at the trial, not when the day after it 
happened." She continued, "[n ]ow here, you will hear, does he say anything on this tape, one bit, 
about saving his hands, and he had arthritis and was really suffering; nowhere." Trial Tr. p. 
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1913, In. 24 - p. 1914, In. 5; R 723. 
2. Standard of Review 
As set out in Nevarez v. S'tate. l Idaho 878, 880-81, 187 P.3d 1253, 1255-56 (Ct. App. 
2008): 
A post-conviction relief action is a civil proceeding in which the applicant bears 
the burden to prove the allegations upon which the request for relief is based. An 
order for summary disposition of a post-conviction relief application under LC. § 
l 9-4906(c) is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56. Therefore, summary dismissal of a post-conviction 
application is appropriate only if there exists no genuine issue of material fact 
which, ifresolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle him to the requested 
relief. If a genuine factual is presented an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. On review of a summary dismissal, we must examine the record to 
dete1mine whether the trial court correctly found that there existed no genuine 
issue of material fact and that the State was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. We liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party. However, we do not give evidentiary value to mere conclusory 
allegations that are unsuppo1ied by admissible evidence. 
Id., citations omitted. 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact. 
Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 61 P.3d 260 (2011 ); Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668,698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070 (1984). A reviewing court will defer to the district court's 
factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, but will exercise free review over the 
application of the relevant law to those facts. Booth, supra. 
3. Argument 
The district court erred in summarily dismissing the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in failing to cite the proper evidence rule to allow introduction of the police 
inte1rngation. A genuine of material fact was raised both as to whether counsel was 
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deficient in failing to cite the proper evidence rule and as to whether the deficiency was 
prejudicial. Strickland, supra. 
The right to counsel in criminal actions is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and by 
Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Strickland, supra; McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 
567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised 
in a petition for post-conviction relief. Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 862, 243 P.3d 675, 678 
(Ct. App. 2010). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must 
show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that he or she was prejudiced by the 
deficiency. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Booth, supra. Deficient performance 
is established when the petitioner shows that "counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard ofreasonableness." McKay, 148 Idaho at 570, 148 P.3d at 703, quoting Aragon v. State, 
114 Idaho 758, 762, 760 P.2d 1174, 1178 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2064). Prejudice is established when there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
proceedings would have been different but for counsel's deficient performance. Id. 
Trial counsel was unable to articulate any basis for the admission of the police 
intenogation. And, the intenogation was not admitted. Trial Tr. p. 1122, In. 2-19; R 524. 
However, the interrogation was admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of rebutting an express or 
implied charge ofrecent fabrication. IRE 801 ( d)(l )(B). Counsel clearly wished to have the 
interrogation admitted and his failure to know and cite to the court the appropriate evidence rule 
for admission fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. McKay, supra. 
Evidence Rule 801 ( d)(l )(B) states that a statement is not hearsay if it is a prior statement 
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by a ,vitness and is consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge the dcclarant ofrecent fabrication. Rule 801 ( d)(l )(D) statements are not 
hearsay because they are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to show the 
credibility of the witness. State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 24 P.3d 44, 49 (2001). Mr. 
Parmer's statements during the police interrogation were admissible under this rule. 
First, Mr. Parmer was a witness at trial. Second, the interrogation statements were 
consistent with his trial testimony. And, third, the statements were offered to rebut the 
prosecutor's of recent fabrication. 
The district court summarily dismissed the claim that counsel was ineffective in not citing 
IRE 801 ( d )( 1 )(B) for admission of the interrogation on the basis that the rule only applies to 
statements made prior to the time an alleged motive to fabricate arose. R 1109-1112. The 
district court relied upon United States v. Gonzalez, 433 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008), citing 
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995); State v. McOmber, 173 P.3d 690, 695 (Mont. 2007); 
and United States v. Bao, 189 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 1999), in determining that this limitation 
applied in Mr. Parmer's situation. 
This case, however, is unlike the cases cited by the district court because in this case the 
state not only asserted that the alleged fabrication was recent, the state also asserted that the 
fabrication originated during Mr. Parmer' s trial testimony. See R 993, wherein Mr. Parmer 
makes this argument in his Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal. The 
police interrogation, while undertaken after Mr. Parmer was accused and arrested, nonetheless 
was made the day of the confrontation call. Trial Tr. p. 1110, In. 1 R 521. And, both the 
call and the interrogation occurred the day after the alleged offense. Trial Tr. p. 1846, In. 8- l 1; R 
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706. The prosecution asserted that Mr. Parmer had made up the statements about arthritis and 
tired hands, "at the trial, not the day after it happened." Trial Tr. p. 1913, In. 24-p. 1914, In. 5; 
R 723. The police interrogation would have rebutted this claim of fabrication at trial and was 
therefore admissible regardless of the holdings of the Ninth Circuit and Montana cases which 
were factually distinguishable. 
R 994. 
As argued to the district court: 
Since the evidence in this case was offered for a rehabilitative purpose and not for 
substantive evidence, it was admissible under IRE 80I(d)(1)(B). Out-of-court 
statements are hearsay only when offered "to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." State v. Howell, 137 Idaho 817, 820-21 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting IRE 
801 ( c)) (holding out of court statement offered to rehabilitate a witness after a 
charge of recent fabrication is not hearsay); see State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 
731 (2001 )('Prior consistent statements may be offered to show that the witness 
did not recently fabricate testimony. Id. Such statements are not hearsay, because 
the statement is not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the 
declaration but to show the credibility of the witness.'). 
For the reasons argued in the district court, the district court erred in dctennining that the 
police interrogation was not admissible under IRE 80l(d)(l)(B). Moreover, the district court 
erred in determining that there was not a material issue of fact as to whether trial counsel was 
deficient in not offering IRE 80l(d)(l)(B) as a basis for admission of the interrogation. 
Further, as argued in the district court, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the deficiency of counsel was prejudicial. R 877. The evidence against Mr. Parmer was 
not convincing enough for the original jury to return a conviction. And, the case turned on the 
credibility of Mr. Parmer. Had the state's false accusation that Mr. Parmer fabricated his 
testimony about his reason for using the massager with K.R. at trial been rebutted with the 
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consistent statements from the police interrogation, there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the second trial would have been different - either another hung jury or an acquittal. 
Therefore, the district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
B. The District Court Ened in Summarily Dismissing the Claim That Trial 
Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to Present Evidence Concerning the 
Ilioinguinal Nerve 
1. Facts Relevant to the Claim 
Mr. Parmer' s petition for post-conviction relief raised the claim the trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to present evidence about the ilioinguinal nerve. The ilioinguinal nerve is a 
branch of the first lumbar nerve that is distributed to the muscles of the abdomen, to the skin of 
the proximal and medial part of the thigh, and to the base of the penis and scrotum in men and 
the mons veneris and labia majora in women. ln women, the anterior labial nerves are branches 
of the ilioinguinal nerve and a stimulus in an area three inches or more from the labia could 
subjectively be mistaken for physical contact with the clitoris and the labia. R 20-21. 
Mr. Parmer and trial counsel discussed this and trial counsel represented to Mr. Parmer 
that his testimony as well as expert testimony regarding the nerve would be key to establishing 
that Mr. Parmer did not touch K.R. 's genital area. R 21. However, trial counsel failed to present 
this testimony at trial. Id. 
The district court summarily dismissed the claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to 
present evidence regarding the nerve, stating that even assuming counsel's fai I ure was the result 
of inadequate preparation or some other shortcoming capable of objective evaluation, the court 
could not conclude that there is a reasonable probability that but for such failure, Mr. Parmer 
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\vould not have been convicted. R 11 court supported this conclusion by noting that the 
stimulation of the i lioinguinal nerve does not provide an explanation of the sexual contact with 
the other 404(b) witnesses, and further that K.R. had testified that Mr. Parmer put his fingers 
inside her vagina with his other hand. Id. 
2. Standard olReview 
The standard of review set out above applies to this claim. 
3. Argument 
The district court concluded that summary dismissal was appropriate because the 
testimony would not explain the contact with other women and because K.R. had testified that 
Mr. Parmer put his fingers inside her therefore, there was not a reasonable probability 
that if counsel had not been deficient in not presenting testimony regarding the ilioinguinal nerve 
the outcome would have been different. 
However, the salient relevant question for the jury was Mr. Parmer's alleged contact with 
K.R., not his contact with other women. And, the first jury understood this because it heard the 
404(b) testimony, yet did not convict Mr. Parmer. The district court's comment that the 
testimony about the nerve would not explain contact with other women misses the mark and does 
not support its conclusion that there was not a genuine issue of material fact regarding prejudice. 
Further, K.R. testified to digital penetration in the first trial. First Trial Tr. p. 196, In. 18-
ln. 24. Yet, the jury could not reach a verdict of guilty. It does not logically follow that the 
second jury would have been any more likely to believe K.R. 's allegations of digital penetration 
than was the first jury. It is certainly likely that the second jury rejected the testimony of digital 
penetration and rather convicted only upon claims regarding the massager. Therefore, the district 
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court's conclusion that, because of the testimony of digital penetration. there was not a genuine 
issue of material fact as to prejudice from the deficiency of counsel in failing to present evidence 
of the ilioinguinal nerve was incorrect. There was, in fact, a genuine question of material fact as 
to whether there was a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficiency, the outcome 
would have been different. Strickland, supra. The district court erred in summarily dismissing 
this claim. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The district court erred in summarily dismissing both the claim that counsel was 
ineffective in not getting the police interrogation admitted and in not presenting evidence 
regarding the ilioinguinal nerve. Mr. Parmer therefore requests that this Court reverse the order 
granting summary dismissal and remand with instructions either to grant an evidentiary hearing 
or to grant post-conviction relief. 




Attorney for James Parmer 
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